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TRADEMARK LAW - MONOPOLY TRADEMARK HELD GE-
NERIC UNDER A "MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE APPROACH."
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316
(9th Cir. 1982).
In the mid-1930's the Parker Brother's Company (Parker
Brother's)' began manufacturing a board game, the object of which
was to acquire real estate and build monopolies. 2 Thereafter, Parker
Brother's acquired trademark rights in the word "Monopoly."3 In the
early 1970's, an entrepreneur conceived an idea for a board game
which, in contrast to Parker Brother's game, involved the object of pro-
moting free enterprise by dissolving trusts and monopolies.4 The game
was first marketed under the name "Bust the Trust," but was later
renamed "Anti-Monopoly" to improve sales.' The entrepreneur subse-
quently filed suit 6 to challenge the validity of Parker Brother's trade-
mark on the ground that it had become generic.7 In Anti-Monopoly,
Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc. ,' the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that the word "Monopoly" was ge-
neric9 and set forth new guidelines for determining whether trademarks
are generic.
Although at common law trademarks functioned simply as a
means of producer identification,' I the rights of trademark owners have
1. Although the trademark rights to Monopoly were first granted to the Parker
Brother's, General Mills Fun Group, Inc., acceded to those rights as successor
corporation. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d
1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
2. For a detailed discussion of the origin of the game, see Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v.
General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
3. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d 296, 299 (9th
Cir. 1979),remanded, 515 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
4. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 448, 450
(N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234
(1983).
5. Anti-Monopoly, 515 F. Supp. at 450.
6. The suit sought a declaratory judgment that the Monopoly trademark was invalid
and should therefore have its registration cancelled. Ani-Monopoly, 684 F.2d at
1318.
7. Plaintiff further asserted that the trademark was invalid on the grounds that Mo-
nopoly was fraudulently obtained and that the defendant had acquired the rights
to the trademark through a fraudulently obtained patent. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v.
General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd
and remanded, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979).
8. 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (Monopoly trademark valid), rev'd and
remanded, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979) (trial court applied wrong standard), on
remand, 515 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (plaintiff again failed to produce suffi-
cient evidence to invalidate the trademark), rev'd and remanded, 684 F.2d 1316
(9th Cir. 1982) (judgment for plaintiff; evidence sufficient to have the trademark
declared generic), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
9. And-Monopoly, 684 F.2d at 1326.
10. Although the precise origin of trademarks is unknown, they evidently were used
as early as the fifteenth century. At that time in England, sword makers and ar-
morers were required to use identifying marks on their products so that defective
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since expanded. As the complexities of the marketplace increased, the
role of trademarks became more sophisticated. Today, trademark
rights protect producers' reputations," prevent passing off by competi-
tors, 12 and protect against consumer confusion.' 3 During this develop-
ment, trademark owners relied on a variety of common, state, and
federal laws to enforce their rights.' 4 In 1946, stronger protection was
afforded when Congress enacted the Lanham Act, which set forth a
strong and uniform system of federal trademark regulation.15
The Lanham Act provides that all registered trademarks are pre-
sumptively valid. 16 Despite the Act's bias toward trademark owners,'
7
it also allows for the cancellation of trademarks in limited circum-
stances,' 8 such as when a mark is declared generic.' 9 Under the "ge-
neric doctrine,",2' a trademark is subject to cancellation if the "primary
significance" of the mark in the minds of consumers is a product rather
than a producer. Conversely, a trademark is valid if its primary signifi-
cance is to identify a producer. Because a trademark cannot simultane-
ously have primary significance as a product and a producer, "generic"
and "trademark" are mutually exclusive terms.2' Therefore, trademark
weapons could be traced immediately to the craftsmen. Thus, although trade-
marks functioned as marks of identification, their use was not especially beneficial
to producers. For a discussion concerning the origins of trademarks, see RUSTON,
ON THE ORIGIN OF TRADEMARKS, 45 T.M.R. 127 (1925); R. SCHECHTER, THE
HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 47 (1925).
11. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 522 (E.D.
N.Y. 1975).
12. See, e.g., Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 372-73 (1st Cir.
1980); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 522
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
13. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1946); see also Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church
& Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070
(1978); HMH Publishing Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1974); King-
Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963); Dawn v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 358, 361 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
14. See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:2, at
112 (common law), § 5:3, at 116 (state law), and § 5:3, at 115 (federal law) (1973).
15. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1946 & Supp. 1983).
16. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1946).
17. The Act is to be construed liberally in favor of trademark owners. See S. REP.
No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1274-78 (1946).
18. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1946).
19. Id
20. See, e.g., Kellog Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-19 (1938); Helene
Curtis Indus. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1332 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co.,
343 F.2d 655, 666 (7th Cir. 1965); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus.,
321 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1963); Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Products Corp., 306
F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962); Nissen Trampoline Co.
v. American Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745, 748-49 (S.D. Iowa 1961).
21. "The name of a product or service itself-what it is-is the very antithesis of a
mark. In short, a generic name of a product can never function as a trademark to
indicate origin. The terms 'generic' and 'trademark' are mutually exclusive."
MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 8:12, at 405.
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validity ultimately turns on determining the primary significance of a
mark in the minds of consumers. To prove that a trademark is generic,
the challenger must show by a preponderance of the evidence22 that the
primary significance of the mark is to denote the product.23 Once a
term is deemed generic, 4 it looses all trademark protection and is for-
feited to the public domain.25
Determining the primary significance of a trademark in the con-
sumer's mind is a cumbersome task. Since primary significance is diffi-
cult to define, courts rely heavily on the results of consumer surveys.26
If a trademark has only one meaning to one consumer, the court will
have no difficulty in determining primary significance. In this instance,
a survey showing that consumers associate the trademark with the
product, as opposed to the producer, will accurately illustrate the pri-
mary significance of a mark. When a mark carries two meanings, by
representing both the product and the producer to consumers,27 the ap-
plication of the primary significance test becomes difficult. A mark
may carry two meanings if there is only one product of its kind and
therefore only one producer, which causes the public to adopt the mark
as the name of the product. This renaming of the product develops out
of convenience.2' The difficulty in determining the primary signifi-
cance in this case is that the court must ascertain which of the two
meanings is more significant.
In recognizing the complexities of determining primary signifi-
cance when a trademark carries two meanings, courts have used a
"conjunctive" approach.29 Under this approach, the consumer consid-
22. Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enter., 644 F.2d 769, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1981); Dan
Robbins & Assoc. v. Questor Corp., 599 F.2d 1009, 1013-14 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
23. See supra note 20.
24. For an illustrative list of trademarks which have been deemed generic, see Mc-
CARTHY, supra note 14, § 12:3, at 410-12 (1973), 99-100 (Supp. 1982).
25. "One competitor will not be permitted to impoverish the language of commerce
by preventing his fellows from fairly describing their own goods." Bada Co. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 916
(1970).
26. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 477 (2d Cir.
1963); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
27. Kellog Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
28. id; Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). In a 1981 deci-
sion, one federal district court held that "super glue" was generic and the public,
"faced with a new product category, whose chemical name, 'cyanocryiate', is diffi-
cult to pronounce and to recall," would probably "seize upon a term which al-
ready had some currency in a related context." Loctite Corp. v. National Starch
& Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190, 200-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
29. This approach will be referred to as "conjunctive" since courts acknowledge that a
mark may represent both the product and the producer and, accordingly, have
examined which of the two meanings is more significant. In E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp 502, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), the
court accepted a survey which presented the consumer with the opportunity to
consider the Teflon trademark in association with the product and the producer.
"By using the example of 'Chevrolet - automobile,' the interviewer explained the
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ers both the product and the producer and may choose one or the other
as a final answer. Since the consumer has a choice between two alter-
natives, it is logical that the response elicited will designate the primary
significance of the trademark. Under this approach, even if consumers
sometimes consider or use a mark in a generic sense,3" the mark will
still be valid if its primary significance is producer related.
In determining whether the Monopoly mark was generic, the Anti-
Monopol/y court recognized that a trademark may have two mean-
ings." Yet, the court rejected the conjunctive approach32 in examining
survey evidence 33 of consumer use and motivation. The two surveys
did not directly allow the consumer to recognize that a trademark may
carry two meanings. Instead, the surveys asked consumers to supply a
name for the business board game manufactured by Parker Brother's
34
and to state their reasons for purchasing the product.35 Since consumer
use is indicative of primary significance, the court stated that the man-
ner in which the surveyed consumers used the term "Monopoly" con-
stituted reasonable evidence of primary significance.36 A review of this
evidence convinced the Ninth Circuit that Monopoly was generic.
37
In rejecting the conjunctive approach, 38 the court adopted a "mu-
tually exclusive" approach in determining primary significance.
39
Under this approach, the consumer is not asked to consider that a
trademark may carry two meanings and is, therefore, precluded from
selecting which of the two is more significant. Instead, the consumer is
required to state how he uses the mark and why he buys the product.
The surveys thus in effect ask the consumer to state one or more signifi-
cances that the mark carries in his mind. Once the responses are gath-
ered, they are characterized as either product or producer related.
In reviewing the responses, the court assumes4 ° that each product
difference between a brand name and a common name." Id at 526. After the
consumer considered both alternatives, he thus had the opportunity to choose the
stronger meaning.
30. Id at 523; Loctite Corp. v. National Starch & Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190, 199
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
31. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1321 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
32. Anti-Monopoly, 684 F.2d at 1323. For a discussion of the conjunctive approach,
see supra note 29.
33. Anti-Monopoly, 684 F.2d at 1323-25.
34. Id at 1323-24.
35. Id at 1323-26.
36. Id at 1324-25.
37. Id at 1326.
38. See supra note 29. TheAnti-Monopoly court rejected the conjunctive approach by
refusing to admit into evidence a brand name survey analogous to that admitted
in E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.
N.Y. 1975).
39. Compare the approach used for determining primary significance to the mutually
exclusive approach for determining whether a word is a valid trademark. See
supra note 21.
40. In reviewing the survey evidence, the circuit court examined the district court's
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or producer related answer represents the primary significance of the
mark in the mind of the public. Once the court determines that the
survey results conclusively illustrate the primary significance of the
mark, it then applies the mutually exclusive doctrine to determine
whether the mark is generic.
A survey question which requests the consumer to state how he
used the mark and why he purchased the product only asks the con-
sumer to state a significance of the mark. While evidence of the signifi-
cance of a term in the consumer's mind, consumer responses are not
conclusive in determining the primary significance of a trademark in
the mind of the consumer. In assuming that the responses to the Anti-
Monopoly surveys were conclusive of the primary significance of a
mark in the mind of the consumer, the court erred in misapplying the
mutually exclusive doctrine4' to evidence of ordinary significance,
rather than primary significance, in the mind of the consumer. In ef-
fect, the court held that product and producer significance are mutually
exclusive.
The mutually exclusive approach to determining primary signifi-
cance is contrary to the intent of the Lanham Act since it diminishes
the strength of valid, or potentially valid, trademark rights. Specifi-
cally, this approach eases the burden of proof required of the chal-
lenger of a trademark and weakens the ability of producers to obtain
trademark rights in descriptive words.
By construing primary significance to mean either product or pro-
ducer, rather than more product or more producer, the challenger of a
mark can more easily satisfy his burden of proof. Under both the con-
junctive and mutually exclusive approach, a challenger must prove by
a preponderance of evidence42 that the primary significance of the
trademark is to represent the product. If a trademark has only one
meaning to all consumers, then under either approach the challenger
must show that a greater number of consumers associate the mark with
the product. This burden is easier to meet, however, if a mark repre-
sents both the producer and the product.
This conclusion is best illustrated by an example. Reconsider the
trademark Monopoly. Suppose 100% of the consuming public primar-
ily associate the mark with the manufacturer, Parker Brother's. Also
observation "that the result that 82% of Monopoly purchasers buy for 'product
related' reasons can not be reconciled with the other result that 32% of actual or
potential buyers chose the statment 'I would buy Parker Brothers' [sic] 'Monop-
oly' game primarily because I like Parker Brothers' [sic] products.'" Id (empha-
sis in original). The Ninth Circuit rejected this contention stating, "[T]he 82%
who gave 'product related' answers no doubt had both product related and source
related reasons for buying, and, with some, enough to reduce 82% to 65%, the
source related reason was stronger when the person had to choose." Id (emphasis
supplied).
41. See supra note 21; cf. supra note 29 (conjunctive approach).
42. See supra note 22.
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suppose that in reality 75% of the same group associate the mark with
the game itself. Therefore, 75% of the group associate the mark with
both the product and the producer, while 25% associate it only with the
manufacturer.
Under a conjunctive approach, the consumer is presented with
both alternatives and is asked which the mark represents. Because the
consumer has been shown both alternatives and must select one an-
swer, it follows that he will choose theprimary significance of the mark.
Thus in answering the survey, 75% of the group will respond that they
associate the mark with Parker Brother's.
Under a mutually exclusive approach, consumers typically are
given a questionnaire and requested to supply the names of the game
and the reasons they purchased the game. Consumers are not asked for
the primary significance of the trademark; rather, they are requested to
state a significance. Whether they answer Monopoly (product related)
or Parker Brother's (producer related), 75% of the consumers are mak-
ing a truthful statement. Forseeably, 75% of the group could answer
that they associate it with Monopoly. Based on this response, a court
could assume that the consumers chose to respond "Monopoly," rather
than Parker Brother's, and that the primary significance of the mark
denotes the product. Based on this assumption, the challenger could
have the trademark invalidated. The mutually exclusive approach cre-
ates a gap between what consumers believe and what responses reveal
and thereby allows a challenger to take advantage of the trademark's
two meanings.
The Ninth Circuit's approach in Anfi-Monopoly will preclude pro-
ducers from gaining trademark protection in descriptive words through
use of the secondary meaning doctrine.4 3 A descriptive word is one
which describes a characteristic or ingredient of the article to which it
refers." Under the Lanham Act, descriptive words cannot ordinarily
be registered as trademarks.45 The secondary meaning doctrine, how-
ever, allows a producer who markets his product under a descriptive
word to claim the mark as his own if he can prove that the general
public has come to associate his company with the trademark.4 6 Secon-
dary meaning is found provided the mark used by the applicant is "dis-
tinctive of his goods in commerce."47 The doctrine allows validation of
descriptive words to protect the accrued goodwill of major producers
by preventing competitors from adopting similar trademarks and tak-
43. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1946).
44. Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374 n.8 (1st Cir. 1980).
45. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1946).
46. Id § 1052(0; see also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d
4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 916 (1970); Salton Inc. v. Cornwall Corp., 477 F. Supp.
975, 985-86 (D.N.J. 1979).
47. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
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ing advantage of another's goodwill.4"
While the secondary meaning doctrine allows a court to validate a
descriptive word, it does not provide for the validation of a generic
word.49 Hence, when a producer attempts to validate a descriptive
word as his own, a competitor may argue that the word is no longer
descriptive but has instead become generic and is thus incapable of be-
ing validated. Because the mutually exclusive approach to determining
primary significance for generic purposes allows a challenger to more
easily satisfy his burden of proof, producers who have rightfully ob-
tained rights in the use of a word are more likely to be prevented from
obtaining trademark protection. The inability to gain trademark vali-
dation leaves a producer's descriptive word unprotected from compet-
ing companies who may then use a similar word and infringe on the
goodwill of a major producer.
The Ninth Circuit's new mutually exclusive interpretation of pri-
mary significance may be praised for its simplicity since it omits the
need for complex consumer surveys. But even in employing this sim-
plified approach the resolution of trademark cases remains dependent
upon highly subjective material. The inherent difficulty in trademark
law is that words and their meanings are not fixed entities. As Judge
Learned Hand once wrote, "words are chameleons,"5 subject to
change. Trademark law focuses on determining the meaning of a word
to the public at a particular time." Since this is a complex task, the
approach to determining primary significance should also take into ac-
count the changing nature of words. The Anti-Monopoly court's mutu-
ally exclusive interpretation of primary significance has set forth
narrow and rigid standards for amorphous evidence. In so doing, the
court has focused on simplicity and has foregone the complicated task
of deciphering the meaning of language in the minds of the public. At
best, the mutually exclusive approach can be considered a shortcut in
determining whether a mark is generic. Despite this advantage, the ap-
proach sacrifices justice for efficiency and undercuts the fundamental
purposes of the Lanham Act.
Donna A. Rubelmann
48. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
49. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1946).
50. C.I.R. v. National Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1948).
51. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)
("[tihe lines of demarcation, however, are not always bright.., in light of differ-
ences in usage through time.").
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